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uting effect be deemed proximate. The holding in Miles has not adopted
the narrow view of the Penn case which excludes recovery where the ailment
is found to be but a "necessary condition" to the ultimate consequences.
Neither does the majority purport to bar recovery upon the mere presence
of an incurable disease when there is no causal relationship between its
agencies and the death of the insured."
Fourth, the dissent failed to realize that it was not the mere presence of
an ailment which defeats recovery, but the causal effect it has on the ultimate
loss is the factor which will extend the situation beyond the risks in the
policy."
Fifth, where the insurable risk is expressly confined to accidental injury
or death resulting "directly and independently of all other causes," it
requires the most imaginative interpretation to imply coverage to situations
where an injury, incapable of itself to render a fatal effect, merely accel-
erated an inevitable, and predetermined result.
Finally, the bare statement by the dissent that there is an insurable
value in the continuation of life is indisputable. It is another matter, how-
ever, to find such a value within the meaning of these insuring clauses in
situations where an accidental injury has accelerated the fatal effect of an
otherwise incurable disease. The adoption of such a view would tend to
lead to further judicial distortion and abrogation of the protective language
of these contracts, and in essence would relegate their coverage to areas and
risks presently insured by the general life insurance contracts es
ALBERT NEIL STIEGLITZ
Labor Law—Consumer Picketing—"Threat, Coercion or Restraint"—
Burr v. NLRB.'—The Wholesale and Warehouse Employees Union called
a strike against Perfection Mattress & Spring Co. in support of their contract
demands. In furtherance of its dispute with Perfection, the Union picketed
retail stores that sold Perfection's products, at entrances commonly used by
customers and employees. Employees of the stores could see the picket line
from inside the stores and had to cross the picket line on their way into
and out of the stores during the course of the day. There had been no
work stoppages nor were there any refusals to handle Perfection's products
at any time by employees of the retail stores.2 Perfection filed charges with
53 Klinke v. Great Northern Life Ins. Co., supra note 21.
54 Justice Cardozo in Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 18, at
84, 171 N.E. at 915, illustrated this point when he coined the celebrated phrase "the
common speech of men" in the following passage:
Something more, however, must be shown to exclude the effects of acddent
from coverage of a policy. The disease or infirmity must be so considerable
or significant that it would be characterized as a disease or infirmity in the
common speech of men. (Emphasis supplied.)
55 See Hancock and Grahame, Are the Courts Destroying the Double Indemnity
and Accidental Death Benefit?, 1951 Ins. L.J. 440.
1 321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963).
2 There were facts indicating more than just peaceful picketing. At one store,
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the NLRB and the Board issued a complaint against the Union charging
violations of sections 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii)(B). 5 The Board in a supplemental
decision found the Union guilty of violating 8(b) (4) (ii), but no violation
of 8(b) (4) (i). In affirming the Board's decision as to the 8(b) (4) (ii)
violation, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit HELD: Consumer
picketing at the premises of a neutral secondary employer is condemned
per se by 8 (b) (4) (ii).
The court based its result upon both the legislative history of the
Landrum-Griffin amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act, and the literal wording
of the amendment itself. The court emphasized the numerous legislative
exchanges in the legislative history to show that Congress was concerned
with the secondary boycott problem and intended to remedy it by prohibiting
all consumer picketing in 8(b) (4) (ii) (B).4 In the wording of the amend-
ment, the court emphasized the so-called publicity proviso, and reasoned
that the proviso allowing publicity, other than picketing, clearly indicated
that Congress had picketing in mind and intended to forbid it when they
drafted this amendment. 5
This construction of 8(b) (4) (H) was in direct opposition to that of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.° In the Fruit Packers
case, the Union called an economic strike against the employers of the
bargaining association. The Union organized a consumer boycott of the
struck employer's product at retail stores, to urge customers not to buy
only the primary employer's product, but taking care that the stores' em-
ployees continued to work and that the pickups and deliveries at the stores
would not be halted. The District of Columbia court construed the statute
pickets loudly shouted about "junk in the window" made by "scab labor" and when
the manager remonstrated about this, the picket became harsh and impudent. On
another occasion there were repeated requests as to the home address of an employee
of this same store as she crossed and recrossed the picket line. Pickets at another store
became loud and boisterous shouting that they would never cross a picket line.
73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(6) (4)(ii) (Hupp. IV, 1963). Section
8(b) (4) (ii) now reads:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents . . . .
(4) (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, .. .
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing
contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other
than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including
consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products
are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary
dispute and are distributed by another employer . . . . (Emphasis added.)
4 Supra note 1, at 618.
5 Ibid. The court quoted in support of this interpretation the report of the then
Senator Kennedy that the Senate conferees were not able to convince the House con-
ferees to permit picketing in front of the secondary shop, but that the House conferees
agreed that the union be free to conduct.informational activity short of picketing.
0 Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.
1962), aff'd, — U.S. —, 32 U.S.L. Week 4350 (Apr. 20, 1964).
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as condemning not picketing per se, but the use of threats, coercion, and
restraint to achieve specified proscribed objectives.
This result was reached through an interpretation of the language of
the statute in the light of federal labor policy. It found the most plausible
reading to be that the amendment outlaws only such conduct as in fact
threatens, coerces, or restrains the secondary employers. The publicity
proviso was intended to exempt from regulation "publicity other than
picketing" even though it threatens, coerces, or restrains an employer,' which
indicates a difference in meaning between 8(b) (4) (ii) and the proviso.
The legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin amendment was cir-
cumvented in the Fruit Packers case in order to construe 8(b) (4) (ii)
narrowly and thereby avoid the possible constitutional question of whether
this amendment interfered with the First Amendment's protection of free
speech. Picketing is not merely speech, however. Also inherent in this
conduct is the "signal effect," an economic aspect which is subject to a
sovereign's regulation through valid exercise of the police power . 8 The
D.C. Circuit discussed this duality of picketing and pointed out that the
union had sought to prevent its picketing from having the customary signal
effect upon the retail employees. 9
While admitting the possibility that there might be some circumstances
in which the literal enforcement of 8 (b) (4) (ii) would constitute an infringe-
ment of the First Amendment, the court in the Burr case found that the
dual aspect of picketing sustained the constitutional validity of its inter-
pretation of the Landrum-Griffin amendment:A first, the 8(13)(4) proviso
effectively leaves open the means that can be employed in communicating the
union's message to members of the public, including actual or potential
customers of any secondary employer; second, the law recognizes that
picketing is more than mere communication—that it may also provide a
"signal" to action." The court, as to the first point, indicates that a certain
type of speech may be prohibited if alternative means are available to the
union to communicate its message. The second point indicates that picketing
goes beyond mere speech to a more active inducement and as it goes beyond
speech, it goes beyond the protection of the First Amendment. It is difficult to
tell whether the court is making a finding that the section is constitutional, or
isidenying that any constitutional problem is presented for the reasons stated.
The distinction between the Burr view and that of the District of
Columbia court is that the Burr court found that it was not necessary that
there be a likelihood that the particular picketing will be a signal to action
to the employees of the secondary employer before it can be regulated, since
7 Id. at 315.
8 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S 490 (1949).
9 Supra note 6, at 316.
10 Supra note 1, at 621.
tt Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., supra note 8.
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the signal effect is presumed." The District of Columbia court held that
without this factual likelihood of "signal" effect, picketing would be con-
stitutionally protected.
The United States Supreme Court, while recognizing that picketing is
a form of speech protected by the First Amendment, 13 has also stated that
picketing is more than and different from speech in that it is more likely than
speech to induce action." Picketing, not being the equivalent of speech as
a matter of fact, is not held to be its inevitable legal equivalent." It was
for these reasons that the Supreme Court has allowed a state to prohibit
peaceful picketing if the purpose of the picketing contravenes a valid public
policy of the state. Thus, the Supreme Court has upheld state prohibitions
of picketing based on the state's policy to encourage small businesses," and
to enforce a state's policy against picketing in the absence of a labor
dispute." By the same token the Supreme Court has seen no reason why
Congress may not also proscribe picketing based on an established national
policy."
It would appear that the court in the Burr case was correct in its con-
clusion that the First Amendment protection does not depend upon the
likelihood that the picketing may be a signal for action," but that Congress
may prohibit the picketing if it contravenes a strong national policy. The
pivotal question then is whether Congress actually prohibited all secondary
consumer picketing.
The legislative history of the amendments, which was cited in the Burr
case would seem to indicate that Congress did intend to prohibit consumer
picketing per se. This also was the interpretation given to the amendments
by the NLRB.2° However, the Senate Labor Committee understood the
amendment to prohibit a union from "threatening, coercing, or restraining"
a secondary employer, and nowhere in its analysis of the provisions of the
amendment is mention made of consumer picketing or of any intention or
meaning to prohibit any such picketing per se.21
The words "threaten, coerce, or restrain" have been interpreted by the
12 Supra note 1, at 621.
18 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
14 Hughes v. Superior 'Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
16 Id. at 465.
la International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Henke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
17 Teamster's Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). See discussion on the
subject of the Supreme Court's application of free speech protection to the regu-
lation of peaceful picketing discussed in a casenote, supra page 768, treating Schwartz-
Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionary Workers, 222 Cal. App. 2d 378, 35
Cal. Rptr. 179 (1963).
18 International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951).
78 Supra note 1, at 621.
20 Desmond, Consumer Picketing: The Limited Restrictions of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 79, 81 (1962).
21 1 Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of
1959 965 (G.P.O. 1959).
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Supreme Court as restrictive and narrow in scope. In interpreting the former
section 8(b) (4), the Court stated that the words "induce or encourage,"
are broader in scope and effectively prohibited peaceful picketing, while it
intimated that the words "restrain or coerce" would not have manifested such
intent.22 It must be assumed that Congress knew of the legal effect of these
words when it chose to use them. The wording of 8(b) (4) (ii) as finally
passed is the same as was analyzed by the Senate Committee, prohibiting
only "threatening, coercing, or restraining" a secondary employer engaged
in commerce. As pointing out in the Fruit Packers case, when Congress
wanted to prohibit picketing per se, it knew how to do so.28 This is
evidenced by section 8(13)(7) which forbids a union from picketing or
causing to be picketed, any employer, for a proscribed object.24 For these
reasons it is submitted that the correct interpretation of 8(b)(4)(ii) is
that of the Fruit Packers case.
Because of the decision in the Burr case, the intent of Congress in en-
acting 8 (b) (4) has been cast very much in doubt. It is a doubt that can be
removed only by a pronouncement of the Supreme Court, or by a clarification
by Congress.
GLEN B. SMITH
Labor Law—Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959—Challenging the Denial of an Equal Right to Nominate Under
§ 101.—Harvey v. Calboon. 1—Plaintiff, a member of the National Marine
Engineers' Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO, brought suit against the de-
fendant in his capacity as president of District No. 1 to enjoin the holding
of a union election. He alleged that the union had violated the rights guaran-
teed to him and others similarly situated, as union members, by Section
1.01(a) (1) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
19592 (hereafter referred to as the LMRDA). This method of enforcing
22 International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, supra note 18, at 703. The former
section 8(b) (4) has been retained by the Landrum-Griffin Act as 8(b)(4)(i). 73 Stat.
542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 158(6)(4) @) (Supp. IV, 1963).
Section 8(b) (4) (i) makes it an unfair labor practice "to engage in, or to induce
or encourage any individual. . . ."
28 Supra note 6, at 317.
24 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. I 158(b)(7) (Supp. IV, 1963). Section 8(b)(7)
reads:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents .
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be
picketed, any employer. . .
1 324 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 84 Sup. Ct. 633 (1964).
2 73 Stat. 520 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 	 411(a) (1) (Supp. IV, 1963). This section is
part of Title I, popularly referred to as "The Bill of Rights" section, and provides that:
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges
within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or refer-
endums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to
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